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FROM LISBON TO DEAUVILLE:  
PRACTICALITIES OF THE LISBON TREATY REVISION(S) 
Piotr Maciej Kaczyński and Peadar ó Broin 
 
It has only been one year since the Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force and already there is a stack of 
pending issues requiring primary law change in the 
EU. The Franco-German Deauville Declaration of 18 
October 2010 is probably the most politically 
prominent of them all, yet it is not the first, nor will it 
be the last in a long, incremental process of constant 
treaty revision similar to the national process of 
amending national constitutions. All of these 
proposals have one feature in common: none of them 
is an overarching treaty change and each one is 
designed in such a way that amends only one element 
of the system. This, in theory, should avoid the need 
to submit the change to public referenda in the EU as 
part of the ratification process.  
This paper explores the political difficulties of treaty 
reform in the context of five pending revisions. It first 
looks at the Deauville Declaration and its translation 
into political and legal reality. The second part is 
dedicated to the four other treaty revisions on the 
European agenda. Finally, it focuses on some of the 
potential problems in the ratification phase. 
1.  The Deauville Declaration  
The Deauville Declaration of 18 October 2010
1 forms 
the basis of the Franco-German call for a proposal for 
treaty change. The following points are included: 
                                                      
1 Franco-German Declaration on the occasion of the 
France-Germany-Russia tripartite meeting at Deauville on 
18 October 2010 (available from the press service of the 
French Presidency at http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/ 
bank_objects/Franco-german_declaration.pdf). 
•  Establishment of a permanent European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF)-type mechanism, 
designed to safeguard the financial stability of the 
euro area, and 
•  Suspension of voting rights in Council for a 
member state found to be in serious violation of 
the basic principles of economic and monetary 
union (EMU). 
Box 1. Treaty change in order to amend the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) articles 
•  Initiator: Possibly a national government or group of 
states (ideally 27) 
•  Nature of proposal: Reform of Title VIII TFEU on 
economic and monetary policy but may include 
reforms not limited to Part Three TFEU (Art. 48 TEU 
applies; simplified revision procedure may be 
available depending on whether the reforms are 
confined to Part Three TFEU and do not increase 
Union competences) 
•  Content of proposal: Based on Deauville Declaration, 
establishment of a permanent EFSF-type mechanism 
and provides for suspension of voting rights in 
Council for a member state found to be in serious 
violation of the basic principles of EMU 
•  Process: Ordinary revision procedure (ORP) or 
simplified revision procedure (SRP) 
o  ORP: Convention is the default rule; likely to be a 
bone of contention between the European Council 
and the European Parliament 
o  SRP: Only if proposal is limited to Part Three 
TFEU and does not increase Union competences 
•  Timetable: Deauville Declaration envisages the 
changes to be introduced by 2013 
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The Declaration asks the President of the European 
Council to present a draft wording of the amending 
treaty in March 2011. However, the proposal can 
originate from the government of a member state or a 
group of them. The Deauville Declaration by the 
French President and the German Chancellor 
constitutes a beginning of the process leading to a 
formal proposal. 
It is unclear at this stage – depending on the final 
wording of the amending treaty – whether the 
proposed treaty modification must take place via the 
ordinary revision procedure, or whether the simplified 
revision procedure will be available (see CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 215). There are two key questions in this 
regard: 1) Are Union competences increased by the 
nature of policy conditionality attached to a loan from 
the permanent EFSF-type mechanism or by a 
suspension of voting rights? 2) Is the reform limited 
to Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)? 
While the proposals are limited to euro area states, the 
decision still requires unanimity among member 
states in the revision and ratification processes. Hence 
it is important to consider confining the application of 
the changes to only the member countries of the 
eurozone (17 in 2011) and countries with a legal 
obligation to adhere to the eurozone in the future (8 in 
2011). Hence they would not apply to Denmark and 
the United Kingdom. 
The draft wording of the proposal will determine the 
treaty amendment procedure. The advantage of the 
simplified revision procedure is that it saves time, as 
the European Council alone negotiates and adopts the 
reform proposal following consultations with the 
Commission, the European Parliament and, for 
institutional reforms in monetary policy, with the 
European Central Bank. Even an ordinary revision 
procedure without a Convention would take longer, as 
the role of the European Parliament is different 
(consent to the no-Convention mode in the ORP with 
exception vs. consultation in the SRP). The eventual 
disagreement between the Parliament and the 
European Council could result in a Convention being 
forced by the European Parliament, which would not 
be an ideal way to start a Convention. This is not to 
say that the Convention would necessarily derail the 
initiative; it is about saving time. 
It is important for the successful adoption of the treaty 
change that the proposed text does not transfer powers 
to the European Union. In the case of the suspension 
of voting rights, the issue could be ‘creatively’ 
addressed by for example making reference to the 
procedure of Art. 7 TEU (suspension of rights) within 
Title VIII TFEU (i.e. Art. 119(3) TFEU, which talks 
about the guiding principles of EMU; Art. 126 TFEU, 
which already contains procedures by which to 
sanction member states that deviate from the SGP; or 
Art. 136 TFEU, which contains rules specific to euro 
area states). Such a proposal satisfies the first arm of 
the simplified revision procedure; i.e. that treaty 
changes are limited to Part Three of the TFEU. The 
problems would remain, however. First, the 
suspension of voting rights so far has been power on 
paper but never used or properly implemented. 
Second and most importantly, the issue of suspending 
rights in EMU may increase Union competences, 
which explains why the proposal has an alienating 
effect on many national governments and which may 
have a detrimental impact on the ratification process 
of the first Deauville idea of “establishment of a 
permanent and robust framework to ensure orderly 
crisis management in the future”. 
2.  The Treaty-Changing Proposals on 
the Table 
To date, there is only example of treaty reform since 
the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. It is also the first 
time the ordinary revision procedure has been used. 
Box 2. Protocol amending Protocol (No. 36) on 
transitional provisions: the incarnation of the 
phantom MEPs 
•  Initiator: National government (Spain) 
•  Nature of proposal: amendment to a protocol (Art. 48 
TEU applies; Ordinary Revision Procedure used) 
•  Content of proposal: increasing the number of seats 
in the European Parliament from 736 to 754 until the 
next elections in 2014 
•  Process: Ordinary revision procedure 
o  Convention: European Council decided with the 
consent of the European Parliament not to 
convene a Convention; European Council 
defined IGC mandate 
•  Timetable: Target date of 1 December 2010 for 
completion of national ratification; all member states 
likely to ratify without major difficulty, limited time 
delay possible 
 
The 2007 IGC set an ambitious target for the adoption 
of the Lisbon Treaty, which set a ‘target date’ of 1 
January 2009 for entry into force. Had this target been 
met, elections to the European Parliament that took 
place on 7-9 June 2009 would have been organised 
under the Lisbon Treaty rules, which foresaw, inter 
alia, an increase in seats in the European Parliament 
for twelve national delegations. However, delays in 
the ratification process prevented the Treaty from 
entering into force until 1 December 2009, and 
elections to the European Parliament were therefore 
organised on the basis of the formula laid down in the 
Nice Treaty. This had the effect of reducing the From Lisbon to Deauville | 3 
number of MEPs that certain member states could 
have elected to the EP had the Treaty of Lisbon been 
applicable.  
To appease such concerns, the European Parliament 
decided to grant the 18 additional MEPs ‘observer’ 
status only, which led to their being labelled 
“phantom MEPs”. Once the Lisbon Treaty entered 
into force on 1 December 2009, the Spanish 
Government took the initiative under Art. 48(2) TEU 
(relating to the ordinary revision procedure) to submit 
to the Council on 4 December 2009 a proposal for the 
amendment of Art. 2 of the Protocol (No. 36) on 
transitional provisions. The General Affairs Council, 
under the Swedish Presidency at its meeting of 7 
December 2009, agreed to submit this proposal to the 
European Council and notify national parliaments.  
During its meeting on 10-11 December 2009, the 
European Council opened consultations with the 
European Parliament and the European Commission 
on the proposed amendments and requested that the 
European Parliament consent to the decision by the 
European Council not to convene a Convention. 
Letters were sent in this regard by the President of the 
European Council on 18 December 2009. On 28 April 
2010, the European Commission gave its opinion on 
the proposal. On 6 May 2010, the European 
Parliament gave its opinion, as well as its consent not 
to convene a Convention.  
On 17 June 2010, the European Council adopted 
“Decision [EUCO 11/10 of 17 June 2010] on the 
examination by a conference of representatives of the 
governments of the Member States of the 
amendments to the Treaties proposed by the Spanish 
Government concerning the composition of the 
European Parliament and not to convene a 
Convention”. This Decision contained in annex a 
draft protocol amending the Protocol on transitional 
provisions, which constituted the terms of reference 
for the IGC. The same day as the European Council 
issued its Decision, the Spanish Presidency of the 
Council convened an IGC “for the purpose of 
determining by common accord the amendments to be 
made to the Treaties” (11192/10), which was held in 
Brussels on 23 June 2010. The text agreed by the 
European Council was approved by the IGC without 
changes. The Protocol has a ‘target date’ of entry into 
force of 1  December 2010, providing that all 
instruments of ratification have been deposed with the 
Italian Government by this date, or, failing that, on 
the first day of the first month following deposition 
by the final member state to ratify. 
The next anticipated occasion to amend the Treaties is 
the Accession Treaty of Croatia. Even though it 
requires a different procedure, there is a precedent of 
including an issue that is often unrelated to the 
acceding state issue. For example, the Accession 
Treaty of Romania and Bulgaria altered the number of 
seats in the European Parliament for the Czech and 
Hungarian representatives (to 24 each) previously 
allocated to those states in the Treaty of Nice (22 
each). 
Box 3. Croatian accession to the EU 
•  Initiative: Common accord between all member states 
and the Croatian Government 
•  Nature of proposal: Accession treaty (Art. 49 TEU 
applies) 
•  Content of proposal: treaty amending the EU Treaties 
to allow for Croatian accession to the European Union 
•  Process: IGC 
•  Timetable: To take place following the signing of the 
treaty, expected for 2012; all member states likely to 
ratify without difficulty 
Art. 49 TEU applies, whereby following the 
conclusion of negotiations between the EU and the 
Croatian Government, an accession treaty is drafted 
by an IGC. This text is then submitted to ratification 
in the Member States and in Croatia. 
Two additional treaty changes waiting in the wings 
have long been thought as a natural to attachment to 
the next acceding country’s treaty. These are the so-
called ‘Irish Guarantees’ granted to that country ahead 
of the second Irish referendum in 2009 as well as the 
Czech demands for the opt-out from the application of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
Box 4. Opt-outs: Protocols for the ‘Irish Guarantees’ and 
Czech accession to Protocol No. 30 on the 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU 
•  Initiative: Likely to be a national government 
concerned or the Commission 
•  Nature of proposal: New protocol to the EU treaties 
and amendment to an existing protocol (Art. 48 TEU 
applies; SRP not available in both cases but proposal 
may form part of the Croatian accession treaty, in 
which case Art. 49 TEU applies) 
•  Content of proposal: Making the ‘Irish Guarantees’ 
part of EU primary law and allowing for Czech 
accession to Protocol (No. 30) on the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 
•  Process: ORP or as part of  Croatia’s accession treaty 
o  Legally it is not clear if the two protocols could be 
appended to the Croatian accession treaty, as this 
would be equivalent to circumventing Art. 48 TEU 
o  If Art. 48 TEU is used, the ordinary revision 
procedure applies 
o  Convention is the default rule, but unlikely in this 
case 
•  Timetable: Likely to be 2012 if part of the Croatian 
accession treaty; if not, Art. 48 TEU procedure could 
take place any time  
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The elements of changing the Protocols may in fact 
become part of an ever-changing landscape of the 
European Union. Apart from the above-mentioned 
Czech and Irish cases, many other states might also 
consider amending the treaties, e.g. the Polish 
government might re-consider its opt-out from the 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
following political change in the country. The 
Netherlands Antilles ceased to exist on 10 October 
2010, yet they are still referred to in the Protocol 31. 
Or the Danish government (following a national 
referendum) could ask for a change in the Protocols, 
which grant the country opt-outs from EU 
immigration policy, defence cooperation, or possibly 
also the euro accession. 
3.  The ‘rough ride’ ahead 
It is highly unlikely that the Deauville Declaration 
will be translated into a treaty change by 2013. There 
are a number of political and legal problems, most of 
which arise from the ‘threat of referenda’. The current 
Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann argued in 2008 
that the “future changes on the EU treaty, which touch 
upon Austrian interest, should be decided through a 
referendum in Austria”,
2 and has since reiterated this 
stance with regard to treaty change to SGP articles,
3 
while the British government firmly stands behind the 
notion that any treaty resulting with a transfer of 
sovereignty from the UK to the EU would be a 
subject to a referendum in the United Kingdom.
4 
Ireland and Denmark are two states which frequently 
hold referenda on EU treaties due to their 
constitutional requirements. Lastly, some critics point 
out to the fact that the new treaty change could face 
problems with the German Constitutional Court 
following the Karlsruhe 2009 ruling on the Lisbon 
Treaty. How to avoid those rocks? 
First, the suspension of voting rights could, or perhaps 
should be revisited, depending on how great the 
opposition is towards this idea within the European 
Council. The more important element is about closing 
the loophole in the economic governance of the 
                                                      
2 V. Pop, “Austrian minister quits over EU referendum 
clause’,  EU Observer, 25 November 2008 
(http://euobserver.com/9/27171).  
3 “Austria rules out Treaty change to solve euro crisis”, 
Euractiv, 30 September 2010 
(http://www.euractiv.com/en/euro/austria-rules-out-treaty-
change-solve-euro-crisis-news-498281). 
4 The British government is currently drafting legislation 
that would enact a ‘referendum lock’ designed to require 
consultative referenda as part of the ratification process for 
future EU treaties (http://www.number10.gov.uk/queens-
speech/2010/05/queens-speech-european-communities-
amendment-referendum-lock-bill-50622).  
eurozone by establishing a permanent EFSF-type 
system. It could be worth sacrificing one element 
(suspension of voting rights) to protect the other 
change (a permanent EFSF-type mechanism). But this 
is a political argument that does not trump procedural 
barriers to ratification in the member states. 
Second, any challenge to ratification brought before 
the German Federal Constitutional Court could be 
addressed by Chancellor Merkel by requesting a 
parliamentary constitutional majority in the 
Bundestag before she signs the amending treaty (or 
maybe even before Germany agrees to the opening of 
the IGC). At a later stage the parliament will also be 
involved in the ratification procedure. Although it is 
impossible to predict how the Court will view the 
treaty amendments, it is fair to assume that the 
German government has factored in a legal challenge 
and that the Deauville proposals should benefit 
therefore from a presumption of constitutionality. 
Indeed the main motivation behind the Deauville 
proposals may be to secure the constitutionality of 
German participation in an EFSF-type mechanism. 
Any challenge before the Court is likely to concern: 
1) the legality of suspending voting rights in the 
Council; 2) alteration of the no-bailout clause (Art. 
125 TFEU) and 3) the legality of an EFSF-type 
mechanism. 
The challenge of referenda is probably the most 
difficult to avoid. It is often argued by those opposed 
to referenda that they are almost never on the topic at 
stake, and almost always about the popularity of the 
local government or president. In times of economic 
instability those politicians enjoy somewhat limited 
public trust. Hence should there be a referendum, the 
likelihood of a negative outcome in one or more 
places is considerably high. Therefore should there be 
no shift of sovereignty or powers towards the Brussels 
institutions, most of the arguments (i.e. from British 
and Danish) would be addressed.  
The situation in Ireland, however, needs to be 
clarified. It seems that at this stage any inclusion in 
the treaty change of a mechanism that would suspend 
voting rights would trigger a referendum.
5 The 
likelihood of having a referendum on a EFSF-type 
mechanism to be inserted into the treaties is 
considerably limited due to the fact that Ireland has 
already adopted the EFSF itself (the same argument 
would be valid in Austria). Hence, a consideration 
that such a treaty change would have an impact on the 
Irish Constitution is limited. At the same time, one 
                                                      
5 “Roche opposes German push for EU treaty changes”, 
The Irish Times, 26 October 2010 
(http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/1026/1
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needs to remember that it is impossible to state with 
any accuracy the precise constitutional position, 
because the only tools available for assessing the 
situation is the Irish Constitution itself and one 
Supreme Court case from 1987.
6 The basic trigger for 
a referendum, according to the Supreme Court, is an 
evaluation (by the government or by the courts 
following litigation) that a treaty reform alters the 
“essential scope and objectives” of the Union. The 
Attorney General’s Office is responsible for making 
this evaluation and presenting legal advice to the 
Government. Based on past precedent, the Attorney 
General’s Office is likely to recommend a referendum 
for any controversial or wide-reaching treaty reform. 
Regardless of the legal position, however, the 
approach taken by the government since the 1987 
Supreme Court decision has been more political than 
legal, with an almost automatic decision to 
voluntarily use a referendum for reform treaties as 
part of ratification rather than run the risk of being 
compelled by the Courts to hold a referendum.  
So the issue on the Deauville proposal comes down to 
political risk: Will the Irish government run the 
gauntlet of ratification without a referendum, knowing 
that without doubt a ‘concerned citizen‘ will 
undoubtedly take a case before the Courts? Given the 
current political climate in Ireland, if the government 
is seen to have tried to ‘sneak‘ treaty reform under the 
radar and a referendum is forced by the Courts, it is 
almost certain that such a referendum will fail.  
Yet even if everything goes smoothly with the courts 
and the referenda, individual politicians can hold the 
process up as was the case for a few weeks with the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The Czech President Vaclav 
Klaus is known for his unpredictability when it comes 
to European affairs. One way of neutralising his 
potential opposition would be to link the Czech opt-
out from the application of the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights to the Deauville process. 
                                                      
6 Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IESC 4. 
4.   Conclusions 
The first conclusion relates to the institutional 
developments: the process of treaty change becomes 
almost a Union institutional policy on its own. It is 
ongoing. Apart from the treaty changes on the table, 
out of which the Deauville proposals stand out as the 
most visible, future treaty changes could originate 
from the European Parliament. In the legislature there 
are discussions about e.g. the reform of the electoral 
law or about merging the positions of the 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs 
with that of the Chair of the ECOFIN Council and the 
President of the Eurogroup. 
The Deauville process is a valuable initiative, despite 
the critics calling it a “German obsession”. It might be 
true that the legality of the EFSF could be challenged 
in Karlsruhe and the treaty change is the price Berlin 
asks the EU to pay. Is this price worth paying? If 
successful, the treaty change on the eurozone 
governance would close an important loophole, which 
in the first half of 2010 significantly undermined – 
and continues to challenge – the stability of the 
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